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No. 272, 23 May 2012 
hat would be the cost if Greece were 
to exit from the eurozone? This 
much debated question cannot be 
answered with a single number. The 
consequences of Greece’s exit would depend 
decisively on the exact circumstances of 
events in the country itself as well as the 
general state of financial markets in the 
eurozone. 
The ‘immaterial’ costs of a Greek exit cannot 
be quantified into a figure. It comprises in the 
short run contagion in the form of even higher 
risk premia for countries like Spain and Italy 
and the risk of bank runs throughout the 
peripheral countries. 
The ‘tangible’ cost would come in the form of 
a likely default of Greece on its remaining 
foreign debt. After the PSI (private sector 
involvement), Greece owes relatively little to 
foreign private creditors, but a lot to official 
creditors (principally the EFSF and the ECB). 
Why would an exit from the eurozone 
precipitate a default on its foreign debt? At 
present Greek GDP amounts to about €200 
billion (per annum). If Greece were to (re-
)introduce the drachma, the new currency is 
likely to depreciate by about 50% (even more 
if the Argentine experience is of any guide), 
which would cause the Greek GDP to fall 
probably proportionally or below €100 billion. 
The revenues of the Greek government would 
also fall in a similar proportion, from about 
€85 billion today to around €40 billion. These 
meagre resources should be compared to a 
total of over €300 billion that the Greek 
government owes to its foreign creditors. At 
first sight it appears that the foreign official 
creditors would have to write off most of their 
claims on the country. (We leave aside here 
the current €22 billion of claims the IMF has 
on Greece which are indisputably senior and 
likely to be serviced in full.) 
This is the outlook in the short run. A longer 
run view, however, leads to somewhat 
different conclusions. After the initial 
overshooting, the exchange rate is likely to 
return to a longer-run equilibrium and growth 
is likely to slowly resume closing the output 
gap. Experience with similar cases of 
emerging markets suggests that after ten years 
nominal GDP should return to at least its 
previous level, say about €200 billion. 
Moreover, exports are likely to grow by more 
t h a n  G D P ,  t h u s  i n c r e a s i n g  o v e r  t i m e  t h e  
capacity of the country to service foreign debt. 
Exports (in ‘hard currency’) might well double 
over a decade bringing them from €52 billion 
(goods plus services) today to about €100 
billion. At that point, the country will have a 
much higher debt service capacity. Whether 
or not it is sufficient to service the existing 
mountain of debt will depend decisively on 
the interest rate.  
However, before addressing this question, we 
start asking why ‘euro exit’ has so suddenly 
become a real prospect. 
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How did we get to this point?  
At the official level, nobody seems to want a 
eurozone without Greece: neither the Greeks 
(opinion polls suggest three-quarters of the 
population want to remain in the eurozone)  
nor the European policy-makers who continue 
to affirm that the European Union’s main 
objective is to keep a eurozone with 17 
countries. What has thus led to talk about a 
‘Grexit’? The main reason is that as of early 
May the ongoing deposit flight has apparently 
accelerated so much that it could turn into a 
real bank run. There is the very real possibility 
that Greece could have no more fresh money 
in its banking system.  
Figure 1. Greek deposits and repos: 12-month percentage changes 
 
Source: Bank of Greece, 2012. 
The classic form of a bank run occurs when 
savers withdraw their deposits in the form of 
cash (as happened e.g. with Northern Rock), 
but this does not seem to have occurred in 
Greece so far at least. Until late April, as 
Figure 1 depicts, deposits fell rather 
continuously at a rate of about 20% per 
annum. However, the total loss of deposits of 
over €50 billion has not shown up in a 
corresponding increase in cash in circulation. 
An alternative route for Greeks to try to 
protect their money is to open a bank account 
abroad (preferably in Germany) and transfer 
funds from Greece to the German account 
with a simple transfer order. However, this 
route has to overcome several administrative 
hurdles, including the hassle of opening a 
bank account in Germany, which is difficult 
without being able to show an address in 
Germany. This does not seem to have 
happened on a large scale. 
A much simpler way of insuring oneself 
against the return of the drachma, however, is 
to buy German government bonds with the 
money parked in Greek savings accounts. This 
involves few costs, no administrative hurdles 
and seems now to have become the preferred 
vehicle of capital flight.  
However, this option is feasible only to the 
extent that the ECB provides Greek banks 
with the funds to make these operations (by 
transferring money to a German bank or 
buying German bonds). So far, the ECB has 
continued to allow the Greek banking system 
to have access to its normal refinancing 
‘windows’. However, the quality of the 
securities that Greek banks have been able to 
provide as collateral has continuously 
declined and since the PSI has cut the value of 
the €50 billion in Greek government bonds 
held by Greek banks, the bank themselves are 
technically close to bankruptcy (their equity is 
negative or very close to zero).  
  However, the ECB cannot lend to insolvent 
banks. This is why the Greek banks will soon 
be shut off from the normal ‘repo operations’ 
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and the only way the Greek banking system 
c a n  b e  k e p t  a f l o a t  i s  v i a  t h e  e m e r g e n c y  
liquidity assistance (ELA), which is 
channelled via the Greek central bank. Even 
this move, however, will require the release of 
the EFSF bonds to Greek banks, which are 
needed as a recapitalisation instrument 
(agreed in the second bail-out plan). 
The ‘tangible’ cost: The risk transfer 
from private to public sector 
The one aspect of the cost of a Greek exit that 
can be quantified is the losses that European 
banks, the ECB and the EFSF/ESM are likely 
to suffer from a disorderly exit, followed by 
large currency devaluation. Indeed, the latter 
would reduce significantly the capacity of the 
Greek government to service debt in euro. 
Given that Greece is, despite its collapsing 
economy, still running a current account 
deficit of 7% of GDP, most observers believe 
that any ‘new’ drachma will have to 
depreciate by 50%. As this will cut the debt 
service capacity of both the Greek private and 
public sector in half, one can assume roughly 
a loss rate of one-half as well. (We neglect 
here the ‘new’ Greek government bonds that 
were created under PSI and which have a face 
value of over €70 billion, but which trade in 
the market at less than 20% of their face 
value.) 
Table 1 shows the outstanding claims on 
Greece as of end 2011, which amounted then 
to the equivalent to about €70 billion. With a 
loss rate of 50%, this should be bearable for 
the European banking system (except perhaps 
for the Portuguese banking system for which 
the exposure to Greece represents close to 5% 
of GDP). 
Table 1 also clearly shows how European 
banks have progressively and drastically cut 
their exposure to Greece by around €65 billion 
($90.5 billion) since the crisis broke (more than 
50% in two years). Between them, French and 
German banks hold the largest exposures, 
with that of French banks now more than 
three times that of German banks. This is 
p r o b a b l y  d u e  t o  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  s o m e  F r e n c h  
banks have majority shares in some banks in 
Greece. This might also be the reason why 
German banks cut their total exposure by over 
70%, while French banks cut theirs by ‘only’ 
40%. As a result, the claims of German banks 
on Greece have dropped from representing 
around 25% of total European banking 
exposure in 2009 to 15% at end of 2011; 
conversely, the share of French banks has 
risen from 40% to 50%. 
Table 1. Exposure of European BIS reporting banks ($ million)  
December 2009  Dec 09/ Dec 11  December 2011 
Total 
claims 
% European 
claims 
Absolute 
change 
% change 
Total 
claims 
% European 
claims 
European banks  193,521  -103,048  -53.2  90,473 
France 78,818  40.7  -34,465  -43.7  44,353  49 
Germany    45,003 23.3  -31,648  -70.3  13,355 14.8 
United Kingdom  15,352  7.9  -4,815  -31.4  10,537  11.6 
Netherlands 12,209  6.3 -8,724  -71.5  3,485  3.9 
Portugal 9,800  5.1  -1,679  -17.1  8,121  9 
Ireland 8,574  4.4  -8,382  -97.8  192  0.2 
Italy  6,858 3.5  -4,672  -68.1  2,186 2.4 
Austria  4,767 2.5  -2,446  -51.3  2,321 2.6 
Belgium 4,207  2.2  -3,485  -82.8  722  0.8 
Spain 1,206  0.6  -237  -19.7  969  1.1 
Sweden  681 0.4  -388  -57  293 0.3 4 | ALCIDI, GIOVANNINI & GROS 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on BIS Banking Statistics, Table 9D: Consolidated foreign claims of reporting 
banks - ultimate risk basis, European banks claims vis-à-vis Greece. 
We now turn our attention to an analysis of 
the evolution of (banks’) foreign claims vis-à-
vis Greece by sector (see figures in the Annex). 
While the cutting vis-a-vis the public sector 
has been fairly constant at around 20% in each 
quarter between 2010 and 2011 (roughly €3 
billion per quarter, considering only France 
and Germany), there was a sudden 
quickening in the exit process in the banking 
sector between June 2011 and September 2011, 
e s p e c i a l l y  b y  G e r m a n  b a n k s  ( - 5 0 %  o v e r  t h e  
previous period) and French banks (-60%). 
Finally, it is interesting to observe that the 
exposure of eurozone banks towards the non-
bank private sector has remained in the last 
two years more or less stable: French banks 
(which represents around 80% of the 
eurozone exposure in this sector) have cut 
only 5% of their exposure (around €1.5 billion) 
while German banks have reduced their 
exposure by one and a half times this amount, 
cutting around 35% of their exposure.1 
How such a drastic cut in the exposure of 
European banks vis-a-vis Greece can be 
reconciled with its persistent current account 
deficit? This has been possible only because of 
the funding that Greece has received from the 
official sector. As a result, most of the 
reduction in the exposure of the banks has 
been transferred to the balance sheet of the 
public sector, mainly through the EFSF and 
the ECB involvement. There has thus been a 
massive indirect bail-out of eurozone banks, 
which started even before the EFSF 
intervention during the debt restructuring 
process. 
A stiff bill for the eurozone? 
This leads to the next question: what is the 
exposure of the euro area official sector? The 
total is staggering: over €300 billion if one 
tallies up the various channels through which 
Greece has received support. 
                                                      
1 Note that BIS data on German banks 
exposure are marked as estimates and may 
underestimate the real size of the claims. 
At the moment, the eurozone member states 
have already committed about €160 billion in 
official assistance to Greece, through the first 
package of bilateral loans (‘GLF’, €53 billion) 
and the EFSF (total so far: €108 billion).2 To 
this one has to add the exposure of the ECB, 
which amounts to a similar amount, as the 
Eurosystem has a direct exposure through its 
lending to Greek banks (€103 billion)3 and the 
Securities Markets Program (SMP), under 
which the ECB bought Greek bonds worth 
about €50 billion.4  
Any losses on these different forms of official 
support would have to be split among euro 
area member countries. The distribution of 
losses among the ‘share-holders’ of the ECB 
would be very similar to the losses from EFSF 
lending. But with one difference: under the 
EFSF assistance program to Greece, neither 
the Ireland nor the Portugal have to provide 
official guarantees due to their “step-out 
creditor” position, so all the EFSF potential 
losses in this program would be split only 
among remaining MS. 
Table 2 shows the exposure for each member 
country separately taking into account the 
exact distribution keys. 
                                                      
2 In recent months, the EFSF has disbursed several 
loans to Greece as contribution in the PSI operation 
(€70 billion) and as part of the second assistance 
programme to the public finances (€13 billion) and to 
banking sector recapitalisation (€25 billion). 
3 The Eurosystem (i.e. the National Central Banks of 
the eurozone) is connected to the Greek system by the 
TARGET2 system: the balance sheet of the Bank of 
Greece shows a liability of €103billion towards the 
Eurosystem. 
4 The portfolio composition of the SMP has not been 
revealed, but a plausible assumption is to consider 
that after August 2011 (that is, when the ECB started 
to also buy Spanish and Italian bonds), the ECB did 
not buy other Greek bonds and that two-thirds of the 
existing stock at that time was represented by Greek 
government securities. Under this assumption, €50 
billion (face value) of Greek bonds are still on the 
ECB’s balance sheet. ‘GREXIT’ : WHO WOULD PAY FOR IT? | 5 
 
Table 2. Exposure of official sector by country: National central banks and sovereigns (€ million) 
   GLF  EFSF  SMP  TARGET2  Total 
Germany 14,719  31,217  13,912  28,749  88,598 
France 11,054  23,443  10,448  21,589  66,534 
Italy  9,713 20,600 9,181 18,971  58,465 
Spain  6,454 13,689 6,101 12,606  38,850 
Netherlands  3,100 6,574 2,930 6,055  18,659 
Belgium  1,885 3,998 1,782 3,682  11,348 
Austria  1,509 3,201 1,426 2,948 9,084 
Finland  975 2,067 921 1,904  5,866 
Portugal 1,361  0  1,286  2,657  5,304 
Ireland 863  0  816  1,686  3,365 
Slovak  Republic  539 1,143 509 1,053  3,244 
Slovenia  256 542 242 499  1,538 
Estonia  139 295 132 272 837 
Luxembourg  136 288 128 265 817 
Cyprus  106 226 101 208 640 
Malta 49  104  46  96  296 
TOTAL  52,800, 107,900 50,000 103,000  313,000 
Note: The ECB’s losses are subtracted by the amount of Greek capital paid-up and the Greek share is 
redistributed among the remaining 16 countries according to their relative shares. 
Source: Authors’ calculation on ECB, EC, EFSF data. 
Given that most banks depend on government 
support under the worst case scenario, it 
makes sense, especially for some countries, to 
aggregate the exposure of banks and that of 
the official sector. The official   exposure is 
distributed essentially proportional to GDP 
(the shares both in the ECB and EFSF are 
similar to GDP weights). Given the large 
differences in private sector exposure, a 
somewhat differentiated picture emerges. 
Germany and France, for example, record 
about the same total exposure (close to €100 
billion in each case), but Germany’s exposure 
is considerably smaller (5 vs 4xx) as a % of 
GDP. The country with the highest total 
exposure is the one that can least afford it: 
Portugal. This is mainly due to the 
surprisingly high exposure of Portuguese 
banks to Greece (a classic case of a gamble for 
resurrection that went awry?). 
Table 3. Total (private plus official) exposure by 
country (€ billion) vis-a-vis Greece 
 Official  Private  Total  As % GDP 
France 66,534  34,757  101,290  5% 
Germany 88,598  10,465  99,063  4% 
Italy 58,465  1,713  60,178  4% 
Spain 38,850  759  39,609  4% 
Netherlands  18,659 2,731 21,390  4% 
Belgium 11,348  566  11,914 3% 
Portugal 5,304  6,364  11,668  7% 
Austria 9,084  1,819  10,903  4% 
Finland 5,866  20  5,887  3% 
Ireland 
Euro area 
3,365 
313,000 
150 
59,000 
3,516 
372,000 
2% 
4% 
Note: The ECB’s losses are subtracted by the amount 
Greek capital paid-up and the Greek share is 
redistributed. 
Note also that data for the private sector are as of end 
of 2011, while for the official sector is May 2012.   6 | ALCIDI, GIOVANNINI & GROS 
 
Conclusion 
At present the eurozone countries are sitting 
on an aggregate exposure to Greece exceeding 
€300 billion. Should the country exit the 
eurozone, it would certainly not be able to 
service its debt in the short run when the 
exchange rate overshoots. Over the longer 
run, the debt service capacity of the country 
should improve again (this would also be the 
case if the country remains in the euro zone).  
Given that an exit is likely to be followed by a 
U-type pattern in debt service capacity, it 
might be best to look at the present value over 
a longer period. Greece is starting with an 
export base (of goods and services) of about 
€52 billion per annum. In ten years, this figure 
might well double in current euro terms, 
helped by an explicit devaluation (drachma) 
or an internal devaluation (if it remained in 
the eurozone). After that, exports should grow 
in line with nominal GDP, i.e. around 4% per 
annum. Over 30 years the present value of this 
time path of exports would be considerable, 
but would vary strongly with the interest rate.  
 
 
 
Using the current rate on German government 
debt (1.5%) per annum, the present value of 
Greek export revenues would be close to €3 
trillion, implying that debt service would, on 
average, amount to about 10% of exports, 
which should be feasible even for Greece.  
However, at the interest rate the Spanish and 
Italian governments pay at present, i.e. 
around 6.5%, the present value of Greek 
export revenues would be much lower, 
around €1.4 trillion)  implying a debt service 
burden of around 25%, which might be above 
the willingness of the Greek society to transfer 
resources to foreigners. Whether or not an exit 
from the eurozone is followed by default on 
the official debt depends decisively on the 
willingness (and ability) of Greece’s European 
partners to wait and finance the bridge 
between the short and the long run. 
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